Business drinking: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2025
Volume: 230
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Wang, Jianxin (not in RePEc) Houser, Daniel (George Mason University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Alcohol consumption is an important component of business negotiations across many cultures, yet this behavior remains unmodeled and its potential explanations untested. Here, we develop a theory that combines guilt-aversion with the canonical alcohol myopia framework. Our GAAM (guilt aversion and alcohol myopia) model predicts that intoxication increases promise-making, and will not decrease rate of promise-breaking. We test these predictions using a Prisoner's Dilemma game with pre-play communication in a lab-in-the-field experiment. Among males, we find behavior consistent with predictions: intoxication promotes promise-making but does not impact the rate at which promises are broken. Importantly, this implies intoxication increases the efficiency of communication. We do not observe intoxication to impact female promise-making or promise-breaking behaviors. This is consistent with previous empirical findings that females can display less sensitivity than males to alcohol-induced myopia. Our results provide an explanation for the widespread phenomenon of business drinking.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:230:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125000010
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02