A Theory of Firm Scope

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 125
Issue: 2
Pages: 483-513

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The formal literature on firm boundaries has assumed that ex post conflicts are resolved through bargaining. In reality, parties often simply exercise their decision rights. We develop a model, based on shading, in which the use of authority has a central role. We consider two firms deciding whether to adopt a common standard. Nonintegrated firms may fail to coordinate if one firm loses. An integrated firm can internalize the externality, but puts insufficient weight on employee benefits. We use our approach to understand why Cisco acquired StrataCom, a provider of new transmission technology. We also analyze delegation.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:125:y:2010:i:2:p:483-513.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02