Transparency and trust: the case of the European Central Bank

C-Tier
Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2016
Volume: 48
Issue: 57
Pages: 5625-5638

Authors (2)

Roman Horvath (Univerzita Karlova v Praze) Dominika Katuscakova (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine how the transparency of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy affects the amount of trust that the citizens of the European Union have in this institution. We use nearly half a million individual responses from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey from 2000 to 2011 and estimate probit regressions with sample selection. We find that transparency exerts a non-linear effect on trust. Transparency increases trust, but only up to a certain point; too much transparency harms trust. This result is robust to controlling for a number of macroeconomic conditions, financial stability transparency measures, and economic and socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, including examining respondents in European Union countries that do not use the euro and addressing clustering issues.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:taf:applec:v:48:y:2016:i:57:p:5625-5638
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02