Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric 3×3 example

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 47
Issue: 6
Pages: 663-669

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note studies the relationship between the global game and the generalized potential game approaches. We provide a non-degenerate example of a symmetric 3×3 supermodular game that has no monotone potential maximizer (MP-maximizer). Since the global-game solution for symmetric 3×3 supermodular games is independent of the noise distribution, this implies that MP-maximizer is not a necessary condition for global-game noise-independent selection.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:663-669
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-02-02