Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2008
Volume: 75
Issue: 2
Pages: 475-498

Authors (2)

Johannes Hörner (not in RePEc) Julian Jamison (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study an infinitely repeated first-price auction with common values. We focus on one-sided incomplete information, in which one bidder learns the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning by the uninformed bidder occurs only through observation of the bids. The proprietary information is eventually revealed, and the seller extracts essentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players' pay-offs tend to 0 as the discount factor tends to 1. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information and argue that, under a Markovian refinement, the outcome is pooling as information is revealed only insofar as it does not affect prices. Copyright 2008, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:75:y:2008:i:2:p:475-498
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02