Goal bracketing and self-control

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2018
Volume: 111
Issue: C
Pages: 100-121

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies the role of goal bracketing to attenuate time inconsistency. When setting non-binding goals for a multi-stage project, an agent must decide how to group, or bracket, such goals for evaluation. He can bracket broadly by setting an aggregate goal for the entire project, or narrowly by setting incremental goals for individual stages. A loss averse agent brackets optimally by trading off motivation and risk pooling, which interacts non-trivially with time discounting. An aggregate goal becomes more attractive as early-stage uncertainty increases, while incremental goals become more attractive when later-stage uncertainty increases.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:111:y:2018:i:c:p:100-121
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-02-02