Distrust in experts and the origins of disagreement

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2022
Volume: 200
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Cheng, Ing-Haw (not in RePEc) Hsiaw, Alice (Brandeis University)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Why do individuals interpret the same information differently? We propose that individuals form beliefs following Bayes' Rule with one exception: when assessing the credibility of experts, they double-dip the data and use already-updated beliefs instead of their priors. This “pre-screening” mechanism explains why individuals jointly disagree about states of the world and the credibility of experts, why the ordering of signals and experts affects final beliefs, and when individuals over- or underreact to new information. In a trading game, pre-screening generates excessive speculation, bubbles, and crashes. Our theory provides a micro-foundation for why individuals disagree about how to interpret the same data.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:200:y:2022:i:c:s0022053121002180
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02