Internal and external discipline following securities class actions

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Intermediation
Year: 2012
Volume: 21
Issue: 1
Pages: 151-179

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinin:v:21:y:2012:i:1:p:151-179
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-02-02