A Central Bank Theory of Price Level Determination

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
Year: 2020
Volume: 12
Issue: 3
Pages: 258-83

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper develops a theory in which the central bank can control the price level without fiscal backing. It is shown that the remittances policy and the balance sheet of the central bank are important elements to specify. A central bank that is appropriately capitalized can succeed in controlling prices by setting the interest rate on reserves, holding short-term assets, and rebating its income to the treasury from which it has to maintain financial independence.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmac:v:12:y:2020:i:3:p:258-83
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24