Exchange Rates and Asymmetric Policy Regimes: When Does Exchange Rate Targeting Pay?

C-Tier
Journal: Oxford Economic Papers
Year: 1993
Volume: 45
Issue: 2
Pages: 191-206

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Whether exchange rate targeting helps economic performance depends on whether shocks and spillovers are mutually reinforcing or offsetting; hence, on whether the cost of supporting the extra exchange rate target is greater than the degree of coordination it induces. Asymmetries in policy power, spillover effects, external shocks, or the degree of commitment to the exchange rate target, may reinforce these, making it more likely that targeting is damaging. Hence asymmetries are an important contributory factor, but not a fundamental cause of failure. Traditional analysis of identically symmetric economies may suggest that exchange rate targeting is generally welfare-improving, whereas in practice that property needs to be checked out on a case-by-case basis. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:oxecpp:v:45:y:1993:i:2:p:191-206
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-02-02