Puzzles in the Tokyo fixing in the forex market: Order imbalances and Bank pricing

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of International Economics
Year: 2017
Volume: 109
Issue: C
Pages: 214-234

Authors (2)

Ito, Takatoshi Yamada, Masahiro (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

“Fixing” in the foreign exchange market determines the mid-point exchange rate that is applied to spot foreign exchange transactions between banks and bank customers. The paper analyzed the Tokyo fixing practices, which allow each bank to announce the fixing rate based on the interbank exchange rate transactions at 9:55a.m. Based on volumes of customer orders, submitted for transaction at the fixing price, banks submit orders to the interbank market at the fixing time window. Three puzzles regarding the Tokyo fixing are: (1) the spikes in prices at the fixing time occur despite a high level of liquidity in the market; (2) the order flows before the fixing are biased toward the dollar, which generates a predictable price pattern; and (3) the bank-announced fixing rates are biased toward dollar appreciation. These puzzles can be explained as a consequence of unique institutional features of the Tokyo fixing and of banks' real-side customers in Japan.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:inecon:v:109:y:2017:i:c:p:214-234
Journal Field
International
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02