When Does an Inflation Target Yield the Second Best?

B-Tier
Journal: Scandanavian Journal of Economics
Year: 2001
Volume: 103
Issue: 1
Pages: 119-126

Authors (2)

Roel Beetsma (Universiteit van Amsterdam) Lans Bovenberg (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

It is shown that an inflation target does not establish the second best if the central bank is independent and the government collects seigniorage revenues. To eliminate excessive inflation and ensure that stabilization is efficient, society should combine an optimal inflation target with a central bank that attaches less weight to inflation stabilization than the public does.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:scandj:v:103:y:2001:i:1:p:119-126
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24