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We analyze the effects of bilateral tariff reductions on the profitability of cost‐reducing horizontal mergers. Given Cournot competition in a two‐country world, for any positive tariff below a certain threshold, marginal trade liberalization is shown to encourage only those domestic mergers with sufficiently large cost‐savings and to discourage the rest. For tariffs close to, but smaller than, the prohibitive tariff, however, marginal trade liberalization necessarily encourages all domestic mergers. Moreover, we show that for a given level of cost‐savings, the impact of marginal trade liberalization may not reliably predict that of nonmarginal liberalization. Although at high tariffs, domestic mergers are shown to be unambiguously more profitable than cross‐border mergers, near free trade, mergers which yield the most cost‐savings become the most profitable. Thus, when comparing domestic and cross‐border mergers, trade liberalization encourages the type which yields the most cost‐savings.