Anchoring Effects: Evidence from Art Auctions

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2009
Volume: 99
Issue: 3
Pages: 1027-39

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper shows that the price of a painting sold at an art auction and the experts' pre-sale valuations are anchored on the price at which the painting previously sold at auction. We are able to separate anchoring from rational learning by using the identifying strategy that the unobservable component of quality for a particular painting remains constant between the last auction sale and the current auction sale. We interpret these results as anchoring on the part of the buyers, with the sellers and auctioneers either anticipating anchoring on the part of the buyers or exhibiting anchoring effects themselves. (JEL D44, Z11)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:3:p:1027-39
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24