Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2017
Volume: 104
Issue: C
Pages: 744-759

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We propose an incomplete information version of rationalizability. An action is said to be belief-free rationalizable if it survives the following iterated deletion process. At each stage, we delete actions for a type of a player that are not a best response to some conjectures of the player. The conjecture has to put positive weight only on states, and types and actions of the other players which that type thinks possible, and actions of those types that have survived so far. We analyze some economic applications under this solution concept.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:744-759
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24