Nonlinear pricing with finite information

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2021
Volume: 130
Issue: C
Pages: 62-84

Authors (3)

Bergemann, Dirk (Yale University) Yeh, Edmund (not in RePEc) Zhang, Jinkun (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. We consider a multi-product environment where each buyer has preferences over a d-dimensional variety of goods. The seller is limited to offering a finite number n of d-dimensional choices. The limited menu reflects a finite communication capacity between the buyer and seller.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:62-84
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24