Bidding with budgets: Data-driven bid algorithms in digital advertising

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Year: 2025
Volume: 102
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Bergemann, Dirk (Yale University) Bonatti, Alessandro (not in RePEc) Wu, Nicholas (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In digital advertising, auctions determine the allocation of sponsored search, sponsored product, or display advertisements. The bids in these auctions for attention are largely generated by auto-bidding algorithms that are driven by platform-provided data.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:indorg:v:102:y:2025:i:c:s0167718725000384
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24