Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2016
Volume: 124
Issue: 2
Pages: 305 - 370

Authors (2)

Roland Bénabou (not in RePEc) Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics (...)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

To analyze the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation, we embed multitasking and screening within a Hotelling framework. Competition for talent leads to an escalation of performance pay, shifting effort away from long-term investments, risk management, and cooperation. Efficiency losses can exceed those from a single principal, who dulls incentives to extract rents. As competition intensifies, monopsonistic underincentivization of low-skill agents first decreases and then gives way to growing overincentivization of high-skill ones. Aggregate welfare is thus hill-shaped, while inequality tends to rise monotonically. Bonus caps can help restore balance in incentives but may generate other distortions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/684853
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24