Strategic interaction and aggregate incentives

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2013
Volume: 49
Issue: 3
Pages: 183-188

Authors (2)

Belhaj, Mohamed (Aix-Marseille Université) Deroïan, Frédéric (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider a model of interdependent efforts, with linear interaction and lower bound on effort. Our setting encompasses asymmetric interaction and heterogeneous agents’ characteristics. We examine the impact of a rise of cross-effects on aggregate efforts. We show that the sign of the comparative static effects is related to a condition of balancedness of the interaction. Moreover, we point out that asymmetry and heterogeneous characteristics are sources of non-monotonic variation of aggregate efforts.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:3:p:183-188
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24