A market interpretation of the proportional extended core

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 3
Pages: 636-638

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Any TU-game can be generated from a production economy with indivisible labor inputs. An equilibrium of that economy always exists after a central intervention that taxes income and subsidizes production. The set of equilibrium allocations corresponding to the smallest income tax coincides with the proportional extended core of the game.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:636-638
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24