An Economic Model of Representative Democracy

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1997
Volume: 112
Issue: 1
Pages: 85-114

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy-making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office. The approach has a number of attractive features. First, it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by, as well as of, the people. Second, the model is analytically tractable, being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally. Third, it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:1:p:85-114.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24