A public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 123
Issue: 1
Pages: 79-81

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:1:p:79-81
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24