Courtship as a Waiting Game.

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1993
Volume: 101
Issue: 1
Pages: 185-202

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In most times and places, women on average marry older men. The authors suggest a partial explanation. If the economi c roles of males are more specialized than those of females, the desirability of a female as a mate may become evident at an earlier age than is the case for males. Males with good prospects will wait unti l their economic success is revealed before choosing a bride. Those wi th poor prospects try to marry young. In equilibrium, the most desirabl e young females choose successful older males. The less desirable youn g females have no better option than to marry available young males. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:101:y:1993:i:1:p:185-202
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24