When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?

S-Tier

Journal: Review of Economic Studies

Year: 1985

Volume: 52

Issue: 4

Pages: 715-718

Authors (2)

Theodore C. Bergstrom (University of California-Santa...) Hal R. Varian (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We present some examples of Nash equilibria that are independent of the distribution of some parameter across the economic agents and describe a general theorem that characterizes this phenomenon.

When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?

Authors (2)

Abstract

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