Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: The hidden cost of hiding

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2016
Volume: 149
Issue: C
Pages: 141-144

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A monopolist can use a ‘tracking’ technology to identify a consumer’s willingness to pay with some probability. Consumers can counteract tracking by acquiring a ‘hiding’ technology. We show that consumers may be collectively better off absent this hiding technology.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:141-144
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24