Sustainable collusion on separate markets

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 99
Issue: 2
Pages: 384-386

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a Cournot duopoly where firms incur a fixed cost for serving each market, collusion is easier to sustain with production quotas if the fixed cost is small enough, and with market sharing agreements if it is large enough.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:384-386
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24