Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 107
Issue: 1
Pages: 52-54

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity--one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:52-54
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24