Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2020
Volume: 110
Issue: 7
Pages: 2065-2102

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of federal lobbying. Absent of disclosure requirements, charitable giving may be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and subsidized by taxpayers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:7:p:2065-2102
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24