Does monitoring deter future cheating? The case of external examiners in Italian schools

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2021
Volume: 201
Issue: C

Authors (4)

Bertoni, Marco (Università degli Studi di Pado...) Brunello, Giorgio (Università degli Studi di Pado...) De Benedetto, Marco Alberto (not in RePEc) De Paola, Maria (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to schools in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that persistence is short lived.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:201:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521000197
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24