Designing efficient markets for carbon offsets with distributional constraints

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Year: 2015
Volume: 70
Issue: C
Pages: 51-71

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper presents an assessment of the relative efficacy of three key instruments – baselines, trade ratios and limits - which are under policy discussion in the design of carbon offset programs. We rank the instruments by their implications for total emissions, economic efficiency, and efficiency gain relative to a distributional transfer from capped to uncapped sectors. We find that the baseline is the best instrument for maximizing welfare as it directly reduces the share of offsets that are non-additional and that second-best policies do not sacrifice much welfare relative to the standard first-best policy prescription.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeeman:v:70:y:2015:i:c:p:51-71
Journal Field
Environment
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24