Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2003
Volume: 111
Issue: 4
Pages: 733-764

Authors (2)

B. Douglas Bernheim (Stanford University) Sergei Severinov (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the United States, more than two-thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children. In contrast, gifts given before death are usually unequal. These findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers. In this paper, we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent's altruistic preferences. The theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture, which prevails in other societies.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:111:y:2003:i:4:p:733-764
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24