Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information

C-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 84
Issue: C
Pages: 83-93

Authors (3)

Bhowmik, Anuj (Indian Statistical Institute) Centrone, Francesca (not in RePEc) Martellotti, Anna (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.336 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon–Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. We also formulate a notion of incentive compatibility suitable for coalitional models and study it in relation to equilibria.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:84:y:2019:i:c:p:83-93
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24