Sequential Equilibrium and Competition in a Diamond-Dybvig Banking Model

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Dynamics
Year: 1998
Volume: 1
Issue: 4
Pages: 859-877

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Within the framework of a Diamond-Dybvig model (1983), but with explicitly modelling the autarky choice during the planning period, we demonstrate that a mixed strategy bank run equilibrium that does not rely on sunspots may coexist with the sunspot run equilibrium previously studied in the literature. In a version of the model with multiple banks, there exist sequential equilibrium that imply positive results. However, the zero-profit contract in which runs never occur can be supported as the unique equilibrium outcome if the agents play pure strategies only and their beliefs are restricted to be consistent with a forward induction argument. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:red:issued:v:1:y:1998:i:4:p:859-877
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24