Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 119
Issue: C
Pages: 339-357

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study procrastination in the context of a field experiment involving students who must exert costly effort to complete certain tasks by a fixed deadline. We document a robust demand for commitment, in the form of self-imposed deadlines. On the other hand, deadlines do not increase completion rates in our experiment. Furthermore, while we find that present-bias is widespread in the sample, and present-biased students procrastinate in single task treatments, we find that they successfully manage to self-control in repeated task treatments. Finally, we find evidence that students do not set deadlines optimally and that deadlines may hurt them, due to various behavioral components of students' anticipation formation mechanisms; specifically, partial naïveté at the deadline setting stage and over-confidence about the ability to complete the task and to persevere on a task after a failed attempt.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:119:y:2020:i:c:p:339-357
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24