Markets and contracts

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 47
Issue: 3
Pages: 279-288

Score contribution per author:

0.402 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable. But, for a generic economy, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained suboptimal: there exist Pareto improving interventions via linear, anonymous taxes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:3:p:279-288
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-24