Stability with one-sided incomplete information

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2017
Volume: 168
Issue: C
Pages: 372-399

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner's type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs. Ex ante stability is a minimal requirement. Bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficiency properties.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:168:y:2017:i:c:p:372-399
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24