Binding promises and cooperation among strangers

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 118
Issue: 3
Pages: 459-461

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:3:p:459-461
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24