The stable fixtures problem with payments

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2018
Volume: 108
Issue: C
Pages: 245-268

Authors (4)

Biró, Péter (Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem) Kern, Walter (not in RePEc) Paulusma, Daniël (not in RePEc) Wojuteczky, Péter (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider multiple partners matching games (G,b,w), where G is a graph with an integer vertex capacity function b and an edge weighting w. If G is bipartite, these games are called multiple partners assignment games. We give a polynomial-time algorithm that either finds that a given multiple partners matching game has no stable solution, or obtains a stable solution. We characterize the set of stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and show how this leads to simple proofs for a number of results of Sotomayor (1992, 1999, 2007) for multiple partners assignment games and to generalizations of some of these results to multiple partners matching games. We also perform a study on the core of multiple partners matching games. We prove that the problem of deciding if an allocation belongs to the core jumps from being polynomial-time solvable for b≤2 to NP-complete for b≡3.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:245-268
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24