Equilibrium Asset Pricing and Portfolio Choice Under Asymmetric Information

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2010
Volume: 23
Issue: 4
Pages: 1503-1543

Authors (3)

Bruno Biais (HEC Paris (École des Hautes Ét...) Peter Bossaerts (not in RePEc) Chester Spatt (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze theoretically and empirically the implications of information asymmetry for equilibrium asset pricing and portfolio choice. In our partially revealing dynamic rational expectations equilibrium, portfolio separation fails, and indexing is not optimal. We show how uninformed investors should structure their portfolios, using the information contained in prices to cope with winner's curse problems. We implement empirically this price- contingent portfolio strategy. Consistent with our theory, the strategy outperforms economically and statistically the index. While momentum can arise in the model, in the data, the momentum strategy does not outperform the price-contingent strategy, as predicted by the theory. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:23:y:2010:i:4:p:1503-1543
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24