Killer Incentives: Rivalry, Performance and Risk-Taking among German Fighter Pilots, 1939–45

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2022
Volume: 89
Issue: 5
Pages: 2257-2292

Authors (4)

Philipp Ager (Universität Mannheim) Leonardo Bursztyn (not in RePEc) Lukas Leucht (not in RePEc) Hans-Joachim Voth (Universität Zürich)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using newly collected data on death rates and aerial victories of more than 5,000 German fighter pilots during World War II, we examine the effects of public recognition on performance and risk-taking. When a particular pilot is honoured publicly, both the victory rate and the death rate of his former peers increase. Fellow pilots react more if they come from the same region of Germany, or if they worked closely with him. Our results suggest that personal rivalry can be a prime motivating force, and that non-financial rewards can lead to a crowd-in of both effort and risk-taking via social connections.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:89:y:2022:i:5:p:2257-2292.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24