A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1990
Volume: 105
Issue: 4
Pages: 1003-1015

Authors (2)

Alan S. Blinder (Princeton University) Don H. Choi (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A small interview survey was undertaken to see how actual wage-setters would react to the central ideas of several economic theories of wage stickiness. Wage cuts were surprisingly prevalent in recent years, despite the booming economy. The strongest finding was that managers believe that perceptions of fairness play a major motivational role in labor markets and that a "fair" wage policy is a good deal more complicated than simply not cutting wages. We also found substantial evidence for money illusion and against the adverse-selection version of the efficiency wage model.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:4:p:1003-1015.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24