Size versus fairness in the assignment problem

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2015
Volume: 90
Issue: C
Pages: 119-127

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assigned is an important design concern. We compute the guaranteed size ratio of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, i.e., the worst ratio of the actual expected size to the maximal feasible size. It converges decreasingly to 1−1e≃63.2% as the maximal size increases. It is the best ratio of any Envy-Free assignment mechanism.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:119-127
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24