Egalitarianism under earmark constraints

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2013
Volume: 148
Issue: 2
Pages: 535-562

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:535-562
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24