Incentives at the counter: An empirical analysis of surcharging card payments and payment behaviour in the Netherlands

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2010
Volume: 34
Issue: 8
Pages: 1738-1744

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In card payment systems, no-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for card payments. However, such rules are prohibited in the Netherlands. Dutch retailers are allowed to surcharge consumers for debit card use. This setting permits an empirical analysis of the impact of surcharging card payments on merchant acceptance and consumer payment choice. Based on consumer and retailer survey data, our analysis shows that surcharging steers consumers away from using debit cards towards cash. Half of the observed difference in debit card payment shares across retailers can be explained by this surcharge effect. Removing debit card surcharges may induce cost savings of more than EUR 50 million in the long run.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:34:y:2010:i:8:p:1738-1744
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24