Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2018
Volume: 112
Issue: C
Pages: 231-241

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Börgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:112:y:2018:i:c:p:231-241
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24