Match rigging and the career concerns of referees

B-Tier
Journal: Labour Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 18
Issue: 3
Pages: 349-359

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on career concerns and corruption by drawing on extensive information on the performance of referees and records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian football league. Unlike previous studies, we can analyse in detail the assignment of the referees to the most important matches, which is an important step in their career. Moreover, we can relate this choice to the performance of referees in previous matches and the evaluations they received in this context. We find that referees involved in match rigging were promoted to top games and that their evaluation was not negatively affected by their involvement in documented episodes of match rigging.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:labeco:v:18:y:2011:i:3:p:349-359
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24