Antidumping and Feed-In Tariffs as Good Buddies? Modeling the EU-China Solar Panel Dispute

B-Tier
Journal: The Energy Journal
Year: 2018
Volume: 39
Issue: 6
Pages: 171-188

Authors (2)

Patrice Bougette (Université Côte d'Azur) Christophe Charlier (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The paper analyzes the interactions between trade and renewable energy policies based on the EU-China solar panel dispute which is the most significant antidumping (AD) complaint in Europe. We build a price competition duopoly model with differentiated products and intra-industry trade in photovoltaic (PV) equipment. We show that an optimal antidumping duty always increases with the feed-in tariff (FIT) program set in the home country. An appropriate antidumping duty—nullifying the dumping margin—decreases with the FIT program. We show that optimal FIT increases with the AD duty. Therefore, trade and renewable energy optimal policies may complement one another. Lastly, we introduce R&D activities in the PV sector, and international spillovers. We show that R&D makes the optimal FIT lower and increases the dumping margin. These effects are reinforced by technological spillovers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:sae:enejou:v:39:y:2018:i:6:p:171-188
Journal Field
Energy
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24