Fiscal federalism and lobbying

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 92
Issue: 12
Pages: 2288-2301

Authors (3)

Bordignon, Massimo (Università Cattolica del Sacro...) Colombo, Luca (not in RePEc) Galmarini, Umberto (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Which government functions should be decentralized (resp. centralized) once lobbying behavior is taken into account? We find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized (resp. centralized). When regional lobbies have conflicting interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under centralization than under decentralization. On the contrary, when regional lobbies have aligned interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under decentralization, provided that policy spillovers on the non-organized groups are not too strong.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:12:p:2288-2301
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24