The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2018
Volume: 108
Issue: C
Pages: 239-244

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide a perturbed evolutionary model of matching on a graph. First, we obtain that maximal matchings are the singleton recurrent classes of the model without perturbations. Then, we apply stochastic stability analysis considering two different error models: the link-error model, where mistakes directly hit links, and the agent-error model, where mistakes hit agents' decisions, and indirectly links. We find that stochastic stability is ineffective for refinement purposes in the link-error model – where all maximal matchings are stochastically stable – while it proves effective in the agent-error model – where all and only maximum matchings are stochastically stable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:239-244
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24