Eliciting ambiguous beliefs using constructed ambiguous acts: Alpha-maxmin

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2022
Volume: 103
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We elicit subjective ambiguous beliefs of an agent with ambiguity-sensitive preferences; in particular, as represented by the α-maxmin model. An important problem with the model is that it cannot be identified using observations from typical choice problems, as the preference parameter α confounds observation of beliefs. Our main conceptual contribution is to show that the model can in fact be fully identified by using constructed ambiguous acts to elicit α.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:103:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822001136
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24